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Reshaping the News:
Moscow's Media Presence
in Developing Countries

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A Research Paper

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GI 85-10076/S June 1985

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Reshaping the News:	
Moscow's Media Presence	
in Developing Countries	

Summary

Information available as of 1 March 1985 was used in this report.

Soviet success in establishing relationships with Third World media has yielded substantial payoffs including:

- Significantly influencing the editorial line or placing its own stories in more than 50 major Third World newspapers.
- Recruiting important editors, publishers, and information ministers in key Third World countries.
- Placing KGB operatives overseas as "correspondents"; 60 to 70 percent of all TASS correspondents are KGB

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Media relationships are developed through one or more of the following techniques:

- Extensive development assistance to fledgling wire services, print media, and government information ministries.
- Journalism training for veteran and apprentice newsmen.
- Cultivating individual newsmen with cash, entertainment, scholarships, duty-free goods, and free vacations.
- Supporting the expansion of regional wire services in South Asia, Africa, East Asia, and Latin America.
- Maintaining visibility at UNESCO as an advocate of a larger role for developing-country media.

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These approaches are working. The Soviet overseas media has over 260 correspondents in 71 developing countries; TASS alone has acquired 18 new clients since 1982. The Soviets' international front for journalists, in turn, claims to have trained over 300 newspersons in recent years. Working through UNESCO, Moscow has sponsored new regional wire services and shifted the debate on a "new world information order" to alleged abuses of the Western media.

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Soviet ability to use this influence is evidenced, in turn, by the success of specific media placement efforts:

- The spate of reporting of US involvement in Indira Gandhi's assassination required the State Department to publicly deny any US role.
- Reports of alleged coup plotting by the United States in Ghana in 1984 compelled the US Embassy to issue a denial.
- The Guyanese Information Minister recently instructed the state-owned newspaper to use TASS news items in each edition.


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Contents

	Page
Cummaru	iii
Summary	1
Background	
Pattern of Coverage	
Soviet Approaches to Developing-Country Media	
Media Development Assistance	
Journalism Training and Recruitment	2
Cultivation of Journalists	3
Support for Independent Regional News Services	3
UNESCO Visibility	4
Program Effectiveness	5
Public Perceptions	7
Constraints	8
	10
Outlook	

Figure 1
TASS and Novosti News Services in Developing Countries



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Reshaping the News: Moscow's Media Presence in Developing Countries

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Background

The USSR is undertaking a sustained effort to gain access to the media of developing countries and expects significant payoffs at relatively little cost. Specifically, the Soviets hope their efforts will:

- Help place Soviet propaganda in host-country media.
- Encourage anti-West coverage.
- Provide cover for KGB operations.

press contingent: 18 correspondents representing at least four news organizations. Soviet media have developed close working relationships with Indian wire services, urban dailies, and the vernacular

disseminate feature materials, and cultivate Egyp-

tian journalists, civic leaders, and government

• India accommodates the Soviets' largest overseas

officials.

• Twelve Soviet correspondents from six news agencies are in Peru, a disproportionately large contingent for a small country. The contingent's size is a legacy from the period of leftist military rule (1968-80) when friendly diplomatic relations prevailed between Peru and the USSR.

Pattern of Coverage

The Soviets have a substantial media presence in the Third World—over 260 Soviet correspondents in 71 developing countries. TASS, the government news agency, and Novosti, the Central Committee news and features agency, have the largest representation. Eight other Soviet media organizations have limited but direct representation in developing-country capi-

Moscow has posted the largest number of Soviet correspondents to Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt, India, and Peru-which together account for over onefourth of Soviet media representation in developing countries:

- Eight Soviet news organizations have a total of 15 correspondents in Afghanistan. They not only provide Soviet domestic audiences with war news, but also service Afghan media, all of which are government controlled, with foreign news and feature materials.
- Six Soviet press agencies with 15 correspondents are resident in Algeria. Although the Algerian Government departs substantively from Soviet views on many international political issues, the large Soviet media presence suggests that compatible ideologies and common rhetoric facilitate media exchanges.
- · Mubarak has allowed a sizable Soviet press contingent to return-six Soviet media agencies maintain 15 correspondents in Cairo. Within broad constraints, Novosti and TASS can issue press releases,

Soviet media representation in developing countries has expanded significantly in the last 15 years. The number of news bureaus operated by TASS in developing countries has risen from 46 in 1970 to 66 in 1985. Novosti has 47 news bureaus in those countries compared with 16 in 1970. The Soviets now have TASS or Novosti bureaus in 67 developing countries altogether, 24 more than in 1970. More bureaus have been added in Africa than in any other region, increasing the number from 16 in 1970 to 31 in 1985. The Soviets have added five news bureaus in Latin America in the same period.

Soviet Approaches to Developing-Country Media

The Soviets are using five principal approaches to nurture their relations with the media of developing countries:

- Development assistance.
- Journalism training and recruitment.
- Cultivation of Soviet-friendly journalists.
- Support for independent, regional news services.
- UNESCO visibility.

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Projecting Soviet Views

In addition to developing direct ties with Third World media, the USSR publishes and broadcasts extensively in developing countries. Novosti, by its own account, produces 60 journals in 45 languages along with foreign-language books and films. Over 70 percent of Soviet international radiobroadcasts, conducted in 38 languages, are directed toward developing countries, principally toward East and South Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa, according to USIA. Radio Moscow's world service in English broadcasts 24 hours a day on all shortwave bands. Radio stations of the Soviet Asian republics broadcast to the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. Radio Peace and Progress, sponsored by the Soviet Committee for Defense of Peace, broadcasts to developing countries on Radio Moscow frequencies.

Media Development Assistance

The Soviets are vigorously competing with Western media services by providing the print and broadcast media of developing countries with services and equipment at little or no cost. In Liberia, for example, the national news agency can subscribe to TASS for \$1,000 per year as compared with Agence France Presse for \$23,000 per year. TASS pronouncements indicate that the standard TASS aid package for developing-country news agencies currently includes:

- A subscription to TASS world or regional news service.
- Installation of radio receivers and radio photocopiers.
- Maintenance and spare parts provided by TASS engineers.

•	Journalism	training	for	news	agency	personnel.	

The Soviets subsidize the entire package, and negotiate a formal aid agreement with the client, either through TASS representatives or the Soviet Ambassador. The agreement usually leads to an exchange of

¹ This approach to media assistance by the Soviets was discussed in May 1981 at a conference in Kiev, USSR, among Eastern Bloc UNESCO national commissions. The commissions agreed that the Bloc should aggressively promote technical aid to developing-country media, offer them no-strings-attached financial aid, and give high priority to training their journalists.

correspondents between capitals, with the cost of a client news agency's Moscow bureau, in some cases, underwritten by Moscow.

TASS has negotiated news exchange agreements with 71 developing countries, 18 just since 1982. The July 1984 agreement with Sierra Leone is typical. TASS agreed to provide its English-language African news service to the Ministry of Information in Freetown and to furnish free radio receiving equipment. The Soviet State Committee for Vocational Training will train an unspecified number of Sierra Leone journalists in the USSR.

Journalism Training and Recruitment

Extensive training programs for developing-country journalists teach the Soviet model of journalism—serving state interests, politicizing the news, and expecting an ideological commitment from journalists. One program is administered by Soviet embassies, which offer scholarships for journalism studies in the USSR. Nominations are made by Ministries of Education. The Soviet Government pays all expenses except transportation, which the Ministries are expected to sponsor. Another program is contained in the TASS media aid package. There is a third program of short-term training in developing countries for journalists in print media and electronic journalism.

The Soviets also use the International Organization of Journalists (IOJ) to train developing-country journalists. The IOJ has five schools in the Eastern Bloc and Cuba:

- The IOJ Center of Professional Education of Journalists in Budapest for radio and television journalists.
- The Werner Lamberz Institute in East Berlin for print media journalists.
- The Georji Dimitrov International Institute of Journalists in Sofia for journalists in economic and agricultural reporting.
- The Julius Fucik School of Solidarity in Prague for newscasters.
- The Jose Marti International Institute of Journalism in Havana for apprentice journalists.

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
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Figure 2. 10J training for journalists of developing countries attending the Werner Lamberz Institute in East Berlin



The IOJ also operates a cooperative program with a journalism school in Bucharest and a training center for Arab journalists in Baghdad.

The IOJ further attempts to cultivate media organizations and Ministries of Information directly through "world conferences" attended by editors, publishers, heads of news agencies, radio station managers, and ministers of information. These meetings publicize Soviet policies on world issues and promote the Soviet model of journalism with an elite media audience. The conferences also help the IOJ Secretariat make contacts, possibly leading to TASS development assistance, Novosti influence in the local media, or candidate students for IOJ schools.

Nationals of 90 developing countries responded to IOJ invitations to the most recent conference cosponsored with the North Korean Journalists' Union in 1983, the "World Conference of Journalists Against Imperialism and for Friendship and Peace" in Pyongyang,

North Korea. The *P'yongyang Times* reported a large attendance from developing countries represented by:

- Thirty-one dailies and weeklies.
- · Nine news agencies.
- Twenty-two Ministries of Information.
- Twenty-eight radio stations, publishing houses, institutes of journalism, and universities.

Cultivation of Journalists

The Soviets take pains to follow up the ties developed in training programs and otherwise ensure that Soviet-supplied news is actually placed in the print media of developing countries and, where possible, in the broadcast media. They attempt to dissuade news agency editors from using Western wire service releases.

Support for Independent Regional News Services Moscow has also supported regional news agencies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America for displacing the

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How the IOJ Attempts To Influence Third World Journalists

Geza Rybka, Director of the IOJ Center in Budapest, describes the Center's method for posing Soviet news stories as alternatives to Western news reports, in effect placing propaganda on a par with news:

Every student knows that there are four or five big news agencies that have monopolized the news flow all over the world. The students are usually aware of the fact that, until now, especially in foreign matters, they used to think the way UPI or Reuters thought. We simply try to open their eyes to the fact that there is another side to the story, there are other parts of the world, and that there are also other sources of information in the world that one can use for journalistic work.

The teacher tries to suggest ideas like this:

Did you hear a week ago what BBC said? And do you know what TASS wrote then? Try to compare it all—and you will get a basis for writing a good article.

We introduced a new practice recently that every day the students listen alternately to Radio Moscow and BBC news. They compare the two, draw their own conclusions, and then report on some internationally important subject.

So we try very tactfully, if I may say so, but very honestly to explain to students that a new information order is necessary and that it means also not accepting one agency exclusively as a source of information.

The Democratic Journalist
April 1984

Western press. Soviet media endorsed the appearance of the nonaligned news agency pool in 1976 (now called NAMEDIA), the Pan African News Agency (PANA) in 1979, the Organization of Asian News Agencies (OANA) in 1981, and the Latin American Agency for Special Information Services (ALASEI) in

1983. The IOJ endorsed the Association of ASEAN News Agencies as well. <i>Moscow News</i> , a Novosti publication, alleges that these regional news services are "breaking the monopoly" of the "big four" Western wire services.
The Soviets offer substantial material aid to the nonaligned news agencies. TASS provides communication links to NAMEDIA and OANA.
Soviet fronts are directly involved in establishing some of these agencies. For example, the Federation of Latin American Newsmen (FELAP), regional affiliate of the IOJ, organized ALASEI. Both ALASEI

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UNESCO Visibility

information.

The Soviets have used UNESCO to demonstrate their support for the aspirations of developing countries in the media field.² Specifically, the Soviets have promoted their model of journalism at UNESCO, attempted to discredit Western media, and cultivated the caucuses of developing countries that parallel their views.

and FELAP are in Mexico City. ALASEI currently

has contracted with 19 Latin American newspapers

and news agencies to provide news services and

In 1972 the Soviets were the first to propose a socalled New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) in a UNESCO General Conference. NWICO, as defined in UNESCO studies, would require governments to take responsibility for news printed or broadcast on their territory which, in turn, would lead to licensing journalists working in their countries. Under NWICO, journalists would be guided by codes of conduct prohibiting stories offensive to host governments.

UNESCO's International Program for Development of Communications (IPDC) is particularly important

² UNESCO sets standards and guidelines for the development of new media organizations in developing countries, funds conferences, and publishes studies and reports, several of which recently have encouraged realignment of world news production and dissemination to favor the developing countries.

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Figure 3. Opening of the IOJ Forum for Peace in Paris on the fifth anniversary of the UNESCO Declaration on Mass Media. From left to right, Kaarle Nordenstreng, IOJ President; Jiri Kubka, Secretary General; and Gerard Gatinot, presidium member



to the Soviets. TASS Deputy Director General Krasikov, in a 1983 *Pravda* article, stated that the IPDC is useful to them for monitoring mass media in developing countries as well as the alleged intrusion of the Western press in those countries, for helping to shape developing countries' information policies, influencing the allocation of multilateral aid, and creating a "new world media order" on an "anti-imperialistic foundation." IPDC provides seed money for developing news agencies at the regional level. Both NAMEDIA and PANA are partially funded by UNESCO. Aside from subscribers, UNESCO currently is PANA's only patron.

Program Effectiveness

The Soviets' methods and approaches for acquiring access to local media in the developing world have proved effective. In the formal aid agreements of 1984, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau agreed to restrict Western wire service reporting on the Soviet Union in favor of TASS reporting on the subject. Guyana and Suriname, additional aid recipients, have experienced a noticeable increase in the volume of Soviet press material appearing in local print and broadcast media.

TASS's offers of a world news service at little or no cost have been particularly successful in Africa in cases where media cannot afford the cost or do not have the foreign exchange for a Western wire service. A considerable portion of African print media, as well as a few radio stations, use TASS in combination with Western services.

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The Soviets can place stories in more than 50 non-Communist dailies and weeklies in developing countries. These outlets range from leftist newspapers in Mexico City, El Dia (circulation 75,000) and Uno Mas Uno (circulation 70,000), used occasionally, to the pro-Soviet, Indian newspaper Blitz (circulation 350,000) and the magazine Link (circulation 12,000), used frequently (see table 1). Some are published by national liberation fronts. Several print Eastern Bloc and Cuban material as well as Soviet. The Soviets have access to all of these by having cultivated individual journalists who usually print what is asked of them.

The Soviets have helped to shape the UNESCO debate over realignment of international news services

Table 1 Pro-Soviet Print Media in Developing Countries and Estimated Circulation ^a

Print Media	Estimated Circulation	Print Media	Estimated Circulation	
Bahrain				
Al-Faqir	NA	L'Essor	40.000	
Al-Jamahir	NA			
Al-Shabiba	NA	Mauritius		
Al-Sharara	NA	Horizons Nouveaux	4,500	
Bangladesh		Nouveau Militant	10,000 to 15,000	
Gonokantha	5,000	Mexico		
Sangbad	30,000	El Dia	75,000	
Brazil		El Nacional	80,000	
Correio Brasilense	70,000	El Sol de Mexico	95,000	
Cameroon		El Universal	200,000	
		Excelsior	184,000	
Cameroon Tribune	20,000	Uno Mas Uno	70,000	
Cyprus		Nepal		
Ta Nea	3,000	Naya Samaj	3,000	
Dominican Republic		Samaya	18,000	
La Noticia	NA	The Commoner	7,000	
Ecuador		Nicaragua		
Periodico Del Mediodia	NA	Barricada	40,000	
Siempre Nueva	NA NA	Peru		
		El Diario de Marka	90,000	
Ghanaian Times	150,000	El Observador	100,000	
Independent Echo	150,000 30,000	La Republica	200,000	
People's Evening News	40,000	Cartel	10,000 initially	
Guyana		Philippines	10,000 initially	
Chronicle		Business Day	31,000	
	60,000	Evening Post	31,000 70,000	
ndia		Seychelles		
Blitz	350,000	Nation		
Bombay Daily	140,000			
Business Standard Link	21,000	Sierra Leone		
News Today	12,000	For Di People	NA	
Patriot	NA 24 000	New Times	<u>NA</u>	
Rajasthan Patrika	34,000 120.000	Syria		
ndonesia	120,000	Al Ba'th	25,000	
Merdeka	100.000	Tishrin	35,000	
	130,000	Tanzania		
ordan		Daily News	39,000	
Ad-Dustur	65,000	Uhuru	100,000	
1alaysia			,	
Chung Kuo Pao	42,000			

^a Excluding pro-Soviet Communist Party and "vanguard" ruling revolutionary party publications.

Source:	The	Europa	Yearbook,	1983.
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to focus almost exclusively on the alleged "colonial mentality" and "disaster news" orientation of the Western media and diverted attention from their own politicized, censored press. Successive Soviet draft resolutions at UNESCO General Conferences appeal to the pride of developing countries in establishing independent news agencies. Since several delegations represent governments that exercise political control over their domestic media, the Soviet resolutions, coupled with active lobbying in the corridors, win support.

Public Perceptions

In terms of effectiveness with respect to a particular country, one of the clearest payoffs for the Soviets is Peru. The Soviets have noticeable access to the Peruvian media. The Soviets have invested heavily in Peru; they have 12 correspondents from Soviet print media, radio, and television in Lima in addition to a large Novosti bureau, said to be their best in Latin America. They entertain local journalists regularly and offer them "fees" to use Soviet stories and features. They are particularly influential in three Lima dailies and a weekly:

- El Diario de Marka. Although editorially independent as a leftist paper, it is the most outspoken and effective anti-US element in the Peruvian news media and consistently supports Soviet propaganda themes in its news coverage.
- El Observador. The paper frequently publishes blatantly pro-Soviet stories.
- La Republica. It frequently publishes pro-Soviet stories and is the most widely read daily in Peru.
- Cartel. It has a hardline, pro-Soviet orientation.

Writers cultivated through the Soviet-Peru Cultural Association publish anti-US features.

The Soviets have been successful in Congo. During the 12 years when the United States had no diplomatic relations with Congo, 1965-77, Soviet and Eastern Bloc access to the Congolese media grew noticeably. Currently, Congolese journalists accept IOJ scholarships to the East Berlin school for print media journalists, East German journalists conduct seminars for them in Congo, and the Ministry of Information employs Soviet media advisers. The national news

Print Versus Broadcast Media

The Soviets have relatively greater access to print media than to radio and TV in developing countries. Host governments tend to treat radio and TV as more valuable political resources and reserve them for their own use. Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, and the United Arab Emirates, for example, ban Soviet media from using their radio and TV but will allow them to print stories in local newspapers. African countries generally have the same attitude. In India, the Soviets can access the independent print media more handily than they can access governmentcontrolled radio and TV. However, a few countries are exceptions: Syria and North Yemen allow the Soviets access to all media; both countries take direct news feed from Soviet TV. Radio Mali and Burundi radio also accept stories and features from resident Soviet correspondents.

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The Soviets do not seem to try as hard with TV as with radio. They have more competition on TV from American entertainment programing and, in Africa, from the French overseas news service. TV audiences are smaller than radio audiences (with the exception of Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Libya, Malaysia, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, which have more TV sets than radios: see table 4). Soviet media agencies have relatively greater access in a few countries with radio than with TV, except possibly Syria and North Yemen.

agency subscribes to TASS and ADN, the East German news service. Coverage of US social issues and foreign policy is highly selective and critical. French satellite TV news and nearby Zairean programing help correct the Soviet version of world news, but Congolese print media frequently use Soviet stories.

There have been several other Soviet successes:

• The Botswana news agency used free TASS stories to reduce operating costs.

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- Radio Mali, the country's only station, takes stories directly from the resident Radio Moscow correspondent with what observers report is a significant impact on listeners.
- TASS provides Shihata, the Tanzanian news agency, with its world news service at a concessionary price, which, together with the political inclinations of editors, produces more news of Soviet origin than of Reuters origin appearing in the press.
- Soviet-attributed advertisements in daily papers have increased both in Costa Rica and Ecuador, which we believe affects public opinion toward US Central American policies.
- The pro-Soviet bias of North Yemeni editors, trained via scholarships to schools in the USSR, enables TASS to make front page news and commentary.

•	Soviet newsmen have	e increased	their	contacts	with
	the Philippine press.				

The Soviets have excellent access to the non-Communist print media and news agencies of India. The vernacular-language press is particularly vulnerable to Soviet influence because many of the papers are resource poor. The Soviets provide them with cash, entertainment, and paid advertisements from Indian firms trading with the USSR. Other forms of inducement include scholarships to sons and daughters of low-ranking journalists for study in the USSR, promises of better paying jobs through Soviet and Communist Party contacts in India, and regular supplies of scotch.

The Indian wire service, Press Trust of India (PTI), has been called Press TASS of India because of closeness with TASS both in Moscow and New Delhi as well as frequent association with Soviet disinformation. A number of pro-Soviet journalists are present in PTI. Another wire service, India Press Agency (IPA), specializing in news features, frequently conveys Soviet disinformation. IPA is managed and staffed with journalists trained at *Link* and *Patriot*, two pro-Soviet publications.

The Western Wire Services

Moscow's effort to access the media in developing countries directly competes with the "big four" Western wire services which, until the 1970s, were the sole source of foreign news for many such countries. The Associated Press (AP), in New York; United Press International (UPI), in Washington; Reuters, in London; and Agence France Presse (AFP), in Paris, have news bureaus in over 100 developing countries and are highly competitive. All but government-owned AFP are owned by cooperative press associations. The Soviets also compete with the Chinese agency, Xinhua, in several African and Asian countries and with the Yugoslav news service, Tanjug, which is influential in nonaligned regional news services.

In part because of the Soviets' co-opting some developing-country media, US Government agencies as well as private-sector firms face an increasingly hostile press in developing countries in which the Soviets have created working relationships with local and national media. India, particularly, has many newspapers hostile toward the United States editorially. The Soviet-aided print media of Congo have produced distorted reporting about the United States for several years with the result that the Congolese public does not have an accurate or balanced understanding of US domestic or foreign policies.

The Western wire services are experiencing rising competition from TASS in developing countries. Comparative costs of a subsidized service versus a service at market prices are a disincentive for developing news agencies to use the Western wire services. The differential assures TASS of access to new clients. The Western wire services usually require payments in hard currency, which many developing countries lack.

Constraints

The Soviets, however, have not had easy access to all developing-country media. Some countries have taken

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Table 2
Radios and TVs in Developing Countries ^a

Thous and s

	Radio	TV		Radio	TV
Africa			Burma	700	NA
Angola	130	22	India	22,000 ь	2,095
Benin	68	13	Indonesia	6,550	3,000
Botswana	75	NA	Laos	225	NA
Burkina	116	15	Malaysia	250	1,040
Cameroon	780	NA	Mauritius	115	85
Central African Republic	85	NA	Nepal	300	NA
Chad	75	NA	Pakistan	1,500	1,000
Congo	96	5	Philippines	2,185	955
Djibouti	18	11	Singapore	490	421
Ethiopia	2,000	36	Sri Lanka	3,000	50
Gabon	100	20	Thailand	7,200	3,000
Gambia, The	100	NA	Caribbean, Mexico, Central and		
Ghana	2,000	71	South America		
Guinea	125	8	Argentina	10,000	5,910
Guinea-Bissau	20	NA	Bahamas, The	115	50
vory Coast	800	562	Barbados	191	52
Kenya	580	75	Belize	71	NA
Liberia	330	35	Bolivia	480	386
Madagascar	910	71	Brazil	17,500	12,425
Malawi	500	NA	Chile	3,250	2,643
Mali	102	NA	Colombia	3,025	1,800
Mauritius	95	NA	Costa Rica	190	450
Mozambique	275	1	Dominican Republic	225	388
Niger	160	11	Ecuador	1,800	135
Nigeria	5,800	457	El Salvador	900	300
Senegal	320	50	French Guiana	40	10
Sierra Leone	100	21	Grenada	50	NA
Somalia	95	NA	Guatemala	500	202
Sudan	1,400	109	Guyana	300	NA
Tanzania	2,000	9	Haiti	120	30
Годо	190	8	Honduras	1,535	135
Uganda	280	75	Jamaica	857	200
Zaire	500	12	Mexico	21,000	7,550
Zambia	150	76	Netherlands Antilles	175	57
Zimbabwe	200	97	Nicaragua	200	127
Asia			Panama	290	227
Afghanistan	135	13	Paraguay	198	81
Bangladesh	770	252	Peru	2,200	860
Bhutan	12	NA	St. Lucia	90	3
Brunei	50	30	Suriname	185	3

Table 2	Thousand
Radios and TVs in Developing Countries a	
(continued)	

	Radio	TV
Caribbean, Mexico, Central and South America (continued)		
Trinidad and Tobago	355	300
Uruguay	1,655	368
Venezuela	5,000	2,000
Middle East and North Africa		
Algeria	3,500	1,325
Bahrain	140	121
Cyprus	400	111
Egypt	8,000	3,850
Iran	7,500	2,000
Iraq	2,200	535
Israel	1,050	600
Jordan	546	201
Kuwait	710	575
Lebanon	1,500	450
Libya	165	170
Oman	250	45
Qatar	75	110
Saudi Arabia	2,700	3,500
Syria	1,800	405
Tunisia	1,124	291
United Arab Emirates	100	100
Yemen Arab Republic	110	27
Yemen, People's Democratic Republic of	111	37

^a Estimated by World Radio TV Handbook, 1984.

reprisals against the Soviet overseas media for flagrant abuses of their trade. In addition, policy differences with host governments may limit Soviet media activity. In 1980, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan forced the Soviets to close their Karachi information office. Further, the Soviets sometimes impede their own efforts with bureaucratic inertia.

The reputation TASS and Novosti have as havens for KGB operations precedes them in some countries. Mauritius, for example, refused TASS facilities in 1980 when the Soviet Ambassador requested them.

Another limiting factor on the Soviets' ability to influence developing media is a lack of commitment by some journalists whom they have attempted to cultivate. Some of the senior journalists whom IOJ has entertained at its "world conferences" may have accepted invitations simply to take advantage of the free airfare and accommodations. The Malian vice president of IOJ, for example, not only attended the P'yongyang conference in 1983, but also has accepted USIA travel grants. Similarly, trainees who enroll in IOJ or USSR schools for an education in journalism may be there because they lacked other scholarship options.

Outlook

We fully expect the Soviets to continue to increase their media presence in developing countries:

- TASS gained four new clients in 1984 for media development assistance and almost certainly will solicit additional ones in 1985.
- Novosti has a new wire service, dedicated to developing-country news agencies, inaugurated in 1983.
- IOJ programs appear to be slated for expansion.

The Soviet effort occurs when several governments of developing countries are independently creating obstacles for Western reporters in their countries. Chad, Ethiopia, Ghana, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Uganda, and Zambia have denied visas to Western reporters assigned to cover wars, coups, or economic conditions in their countries within the last year, according to the Western press. If reporters are allowed entry, they are closely monitored. For example, Iraqi taxi drivers, working for the Information Ministry, have prevented Western press photographers from taking pictures of

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b Handbook figure may be low because of the absence of an official Government of India statistic.

economic conditions suggesting poverty or backwardness in Iraq. Iraq also has confiscated foreign journalists' typewriters at the airport. Western reporters' access to several African countries is encumbered with lengthy visa hassles. Latin American countries remain relatively open to the Western media, although Brazil, Costa Rica, and Ecuador require foreign reporters to register with government-sponsored journalists' organizations. Under these conditions, the Soviet effort creates additional obstacles for Western media access.

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